Rebuilding Syria: Who is counting on sharing out the cake?

History is being written as we speak. Since Syrian rebels entered Damascus unopposed in December 2024, toppling President Bashar al-Assad’s 13-year rule and ending six decades of his family’s iron-fisted dynasty, the economy and the reconstruction of the country have become political emergencies. But who will benefit from it?

As Syria stands at a crossroads, the scale of rebuilding is staggering. Restoring critical infrastructure — roads, utilities, and housing — will require billions in investment and coordinated international support. © Ahmed Akacha

Fourteen years of brutal civil war, compounded by the devastating February 2023 earthquake, have left Syria’s infrastructure in tatters, presenting a monumental challenge for the nation’s nascent recovery. According to a comprehensive 2022 World Bank report, physical damage across 14 major cities – including Aleppo, Homs, and Damascus – ranges between $8.7 billion and $11.4 billion. Roads and bridges, vital arteries for trade and mobility, lie in ruins, severely hampering economic revival and humanitarian aid delivery.

The energy and water sectors are equally crippled. Power plants, frequent targets during the conflict, operate at diminished capacity, exacerbating chronic electricity shortages. The World Bank notes that 51% of water and sanitation infrastructure has suffered significant damage from both the war and the 2023 earthquake, leaving millions without reliable access to clean water or sanitation. Syria’s aviation infrastructure has not been spared: Damascus International Airport and other key facilities have faced intermittent closures, with runways and terminals scarred by airstrikes, further isolating the country.

Housing, a cornerstone of stability, has been decimated. By 2017, one-third of Syria’s homes were already destroyed or damaged, a crisis deepened by the 2023 earthquake, which inflicted an additional $3.7 billion in physical damages, with housing accounting for 24% of the total, according to World Bank estimates. Entire neighborhoods in cities like Raqqa and Aleppo remain rubble-strewn wastelands, obstructing the restoration of basic services and displacing countless families.

As Syria stands at a crossroads, the scale of rebuilding is staggering. Restoring critical infrastructure — roads, utilities, and housing — will require billions in investment and coordinated international support. Without addressing these foundational needs, the hope of a stable, prosperous Syria risks remaining out of reach.

Syria’s Economic Collapse: A Daunting Path to Recovery

Since the onset of the civil war in 2011, Syria’s economy has spiraled into an abyss, contracting by a staggering 85%. According to a 2023 World Bank report, the country’s GDP plummeted from $67.5 billion in 2011 to a mere $9 billion by 2023. Over 90% of Syrians now live below the poverty line, with 16.7 million people — nearly the entire population — requiring humanitarian aid in 2025, as reported by the United Nations Development Program. The Syrian pound’s catastrophic devaluation, falling from 50 to 15,000 against the U.S. dollar by late 2024, has fueled hyperinflation, reaching 93% in 2023. Driven by subsidy cuts and heavy reliance on imports, this economic freefall — compounded by stringent international sanctions and the 2019 Lebanese financial crisis — has left 13.1 million Syrians grappling with food insecurity, unable to afford basic necessities.

Rebuilding Syria’s shattered infrastructure is paramount to stabilizing its economy and enabling the reintegration of returning refugees. Since December 2024, approximately 400,000 refugees have returned, joining 1.4 million internally displaced persons, according to a 2025 ACAPS report. With an estimated 2 million additional refugees expected to return by late 2025, the strain on Syria’s decimated infrastructure is immense.

Restoring electricity is a top priority, as damaged power plants and looted transmission lines have left hospitals and homes in darkness. Similarly, water systems — 51% of which are non-functional, per a World Bank report — require urgent rehabilitation to avert disease outbreaks and ensure access to clean water. Transportation networks, including roads and bridges, must be repaired to revive trade and mobility, while telecommunications infrastructure is critical for coordinating humanitarian aid and establishing effective governance. These efforts are not merely logistical but foundational to Syria’s hopes of economic recovery and social stability.

The road ahead is formidable. Addressing these immediate needs demands significant international investment and coordination. Without swift action, the aspirations of millions of returning Syrians risk being stifled by the same devastation that drove them from their homeland.

Challenges Ahead: Syria’s Precarious Path to Reconstruction

Syria’s road to recovery is fraught with formidable obstacles, including political instability, sectarian violence, and widespread resource looting. The transitional government, led by interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa since January 2025, struggles to unify disparate factions amid persistent security challenges.

According to a 2025 International Crisis Group report, ongoing clashes in Latakia and Hama have fueled fears of sectarian massacres, particularly targeting Alawite and Druze communities, with over 1,000 reported deaths in March alone. Resource looting, such as the theft of 80 kilometers of power cables in southern Syria, has crippled reconstruction efforts, diverting critical resources and exacerbating infrastructure deficits. Security threats, including a resurgent Islamic State (ISIS) and Turkish-Kurdish conflicts in the northeast, further destabilize the country, undermining governance and impeding aid delivery. A June 2025 suicide bombing at St. Elias Church in Damascus, claimed by the ISIS-aligned Saraya Ansar al-Sunna, underscores the persistent terrorist threat, with at least 27 killed and over 60 injured.

The absence of a cohesive administration complicates the coordination of reconstruction funds and risks derailing progress. International pledges from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey — totaling billions for energy, ports, and public-sector salaries — offer hope but face skepticism. Can these commitments translate into tangible projects amid rampant looting and insecurity? The transitional government’s ability to establish unified governance and robust security will determine whether these investments rebuild Syria or merely serve the geopolitical agendas of regional powers, leaving the nation vulnerable to further instability.

Saudi Arabia’s Financial Muscle and Strategic Vision

In April 2025, Saudi Arabia and Qatar cleared Syria’s $15.5 million debt to the World Bank, settling arrears with the International Development Association (IDA) during the World Bank and IMF Spring Meetings in Washington, DC. This pivotal step, reported by regional sources, unlocked access to new grants and loans critical for rebuilding Syria’s shattered infrastructure, including electricity and water systems devastated by 14 years of civil war. The World Bank confirmed Syria’s eligibility for new funding on May 16, 2025, emphasizing the urgent need to address the country’s development needs. This financial intervention reflects Saudi Arabia’s strategic commitment to stabilizing Syria post-Assad, following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024.

Joint Commitment to Fund Public-Sector Salaries

In May 2025, Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud, announced a joint initiative with Qatar to fund salaries for Syrian public-sector employees, excluding those in the defense and interior ministries, to bolster economic stability and support civilian civil servants. This initiative, designed to cover three months with potential extensions, addresses the acute economic strain caused by the Syrian pound’s devaluation from 50 to 15,000 against the U.S. dollar. While Saudi Arabia’s contribution remains undisclosed, Qatar’s pledge of $29 million monthly provides a benchmark for the scale of this effort. By supporting the transitional government under Ahmed al-Sharaa, this funding aims to stabilize the economy and facilitate governance reforms, offering a lifeline to public workers amid hyperinflation and widespread poverty.

Syria’s transitional government faces a delicate balancing act. Political fragmentation, exemplified by tensions over the March 2025 constitutional declaration and resistance from Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) advocating for decentralized governance, threatens national unity. The integration of armed groups, including the SDF and former Syrian National Army factions, into a national army remains incomplete, with foreign fighters in senior military roles raising concerns about loyalty and accountability. Sectarian violence, resource looting, and the specter of ISIS resurgence further complicate the path to stability. While international support from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey provides critical resources, the transitional government must prioritize inclusive governance, transparent transitional justice, and robust security reforms to translate these pledges into meaningful progress. Failure to do so risks plunging Syria back into chaos, undermining the fragile hope sparked by Assad’s fall

Strategic Motives and Regional Ambitions in Syria’s Reconstruction

Saudi Arabia’s financial and diplomatic interventions in Syria are driven by a clear strategic agenda, primarily aimed at countering Iran’s influence, which thrived under Bashar al-Assad’s regime through Tehran’s military and financial support. By backing the Sunni-led transitional government under interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, Saudi Arabia seeks to erode Iran’s regional foothold, particularly after Assad’s fall in December 2024 disrupted Tehran’s proxy networks.

Beyond geopolitics, Saudi Arabia envisions a rebuilt Syria as an economic hub linking the Gulf to the Mediterranean, aligning with its Vision 2030 goals of regional economic integration. Supporting al-Sharaa’s government also enhances Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic leverage, positioning it to compete with Turkey and the UAE for influence over Syria’s reconstruction. However, this strategic maneuvering risks prioritizing geopolitical gains over inclusive rebuilding, potentially exacerbating sectarian tensions.

Diplomatic Leadership

Saudi Arabia has taken a prominent role in coordinating international support for Syria’s recovery. On April 24, 2025, during the IMF and World Bank Spring Meetings in Washington, DC, Saudi Arabia co-hosted a high-level roundtable with the IMF and World Bank, marking the first attendance of Syrian officials—including the finance minister and central bank governor—in over 20 years. Co-chaired by Saudi Finance Minister Mohammed AlJadaan, IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva, and World Bank President Ajay Banga, the meeting built on prior discussions in Paris, Al Ula, and Brussels.

It focused on Syria’s economic stabilization and reconstruction priorities, with a joint statement pledging sustained support and plans to reconvene at the IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings in October 2025 to monitor progress. Saudi Arabia’s $15.5 million payment, alongside Qatar, to clear Syria’s World Bank arrears in April 2025 unlocked critical grants and loans for rebuilding infrastructure, such as electricity and water systems, underscoring its commitment to Syria’s post-conflict recovery.

Challenges to Saudi Arabia’s Efforts

Despite these promising steps, Saudi Arabia’s initiatives face significant hurdles. The transitional government’s legitimacy is under scrutiny due to al-Sharaa’s past ties to al-Qaeda, potentially complicating Western support. Excluding security sector salaries from the Saudi-Qatar joint initiative to fund public-sector wages risks undermining governance reforms, as a stable security apparatus is essential for effective administration. Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s rivalry with Iran may skew reconstruction priorities toward countering Tehran’s influence rather than fostering inclusive development. Sustained security and transparent fund management are critical to ensuring these pledges translate into tangible progress rather than fueling further instability.

Turkey’s Pivotal Role in Syria’s Reconstruction

Turkey’s geographical proximity and robust construction sector position its companies to lead Syria’s infrastructure revival. Following Assad’s fall in December 2024, Turkish firms like Enka Insaat, Yapı Merkezi, and Kalyon Holding are poised to secure high-value contracts for reconstructing roads, bridges, airports, and utilities, leveraging expertise honed during Turkey’s own 2023 earthquake recovery.

A landmark $7 billion energy deal, signed on May 29, 2025, involves a consortium of Turkish firms (Kalyon GES Enerji Yatırımları and Cengiz Enerji), Qatar’s UCC Holding, and US-based Power International to build four combined-cycle gas turbine power plants (4,000 MW total capacity) and a 1,000 MW solar power plant in southern Syria. These projects, slated for completion within two to three years, aim to address Syria’s dire electricity shortages, with current generation at 1.6 GW compared to 9.5 GW pre-2011. Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar highlighted the deal’s potential to meet over 50% of Syria’s electricity needs, marking a cornerstone of infrastructure recovery.

Economic Optimism in Turkey

The prospect of Syrian reconstruction has ignited economic optimism in Turkey. Shares of Turkish construction and cement companies surged 4–10% on the Istanbul Stock Exchange, with the non-metal index, including firms like Limak Dogu Anadolu Cimento and Bursa Cimento, rising 7.79%, and the construction index hitting a record high, per Reuters. Turkish machinery exports to Syria skyrocketed 244% in January 2025, with cement, glass, and ceramics up 92% and metals up 73%, reflecting robust demand for reconstruction materials. Financial analysts project Turkish exports to Syria could triple from $2.2 billion in 2024 to $6 billion within two to five years, contingent on stabilized security, driven by Turkey’s logistical advantages and proximity.

Additional Agreements

Turkey has secured strategic agreements to bolster Syria’s recovery. On May 29, 2025, Dubai-based DP World signed an $800 million deal with the Syrian government to develop the port of Tartus, a vital trade hub, enhancing cargo flows from Turkish ports. On May 22, 2025, Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar announced plans to supply 2 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually to Syria, generating 1,300 MW of electricity via a pipeline from Turkey’s Kilis region to Aleppo, with flows expected by June 2025. Turkey is also providing 210 MW of electricity daily to Aleppo, with plans to increase to 300 MW by autumn 2025 and 500 MW within six months via a 400-kV transmission line from Reyhanli to Harim in Idlib. These initiatives address Syria’s chronic power shortages, facilitating economic stabilization and humanitarian efforts.

A Complex Road Ahead

While Saudi Arabia and Turkey’s contributions provide critical momentum, Syria’s reconstruction hinges on overcoming political fragmentation, sectarian violence, and security threats. The transitional government must navigate al-Sharaa’s controversial past, integrate armed factions, and ensure transparent fund allocation to avoid squandering international support. Turkey’s economic optimism and infrastructure expertise offer a lifeline, but sustained security and regional cooperation are essential to transform pledges into lasting recovery, ensuring Syria emerges as a stable, inclusive nation rather than a battleground for competing geopolitical interests.

Ankara’s Strategic Motives in Syria’s Reconstruction

Turkey’s engagement in Syria’s reconstruction is driven by a blend of humanitarian, economic, and geopolitical objectives. First, Ankara seeks to facilitate the repatriation of over 3 million Syrian refugees currently in Turkey, alleviating domestic economic and social pressures while harnessing their labor for Syria’s rebuilding efforts. Proposals for designated production zones in Syria could lower labor costs and support repatriation, creating a win-win for both nations.

Second, Turkey aims to revive and expand trade, with exports to Syria reaching $2.2 billion in 2024, a significant increase from the pre-war peak of $1.3 billion in 2010. Reviving a free trade agreement and eliminating the Bab el-Hawa border buffer zone could further boost trade volumes.

Third, Turkey is positioning itself as a regional power through ambitious infrastructure projects like the Development Road, a proposed trade corridor linking the Gulf to Europe via Iraq and Syria, and a revived Qatar-Turkey gas pipeline through Syria.

These initiatives enhance Turkey’s role as an energy and trade transit hub, aligning with Ankara’s ambition to challenge the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and strengthen ties with Syria’s transitional government under interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, with whom Turkey has cultivated relations since supporting rebels in Idlib.

Risks and Constraints

Turkey’s ambitious plans are tempered by significant challenges. Its economy, strained by 65% inflation in 2024, a 37% devaluation of the lira in 2023, and $150 billion in damages from the 2023 earthquake, lacks the capacity to independently fund Syria’s estimated $400 billion reconstruction, according to a 2024 U.S. Department of State report. Dependence on international funding introduces complexities, as geopolitical tensions could hinder resource flows.

Rivalries with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who are also heavily investing in Syria, risk creating competing agendas, particularly as Gulf states seek to counter Turkey’s influence while aligning with al-Sharaa’s government. Security threats, including ongoing clashes with Syrian Kurds and a potential ISIS resurgence, further jeopardize project implementation, as noted in a 2025 European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) report. Turkey’s tensions with the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which control 70% of Syria’s oil and gas resources, could derail energy projects critical to reconstruction. Ankara faces a critical question: can it navigate these rivalries and economic constraints to deliver on its ambitious role, or will geopolitical and financial challenges limit its impact?

Lifting of Sanctions and Its Impact on Syria’s Reconstruction

On May 13, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump announced a historic decision to lift longstanding sanctions on Syria during a speech at the U.S.-Saudi Investment Forum in Riyadh, declaring, “We’re taking them all off… Good luck, Syria, show us something very special.”

This followed high-level discussions with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, reflecting regional pressure to reintegrate Syria into the global economy. The U.S. Treasury’s General License 25, issued on May 24, 2025, authorized transactions with Syria’s interim government, central bank, and state-owned enterprises, effectively dismantling financial restrictions.

A 180-day waiver under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, issued by the State Department, further suspended sanctions to facilitate reconstruction and humanitarian aid. An executive order signed on June 30, 2025, lifted five prior orders related to Syria’s occupation of Lebanon and weapons programs, while maintaining targeted sanctions on Bashar al-Assad, his associates, and those linked to human rights abuses, chemical weapons, or terrorism.

The European Union followed suit in June 2025, partially relaxing sanctions except for those targeting terrorism-related individuals and entities, enabling increased European investment. This sanctions relief, spurred by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey’s diplomacy, catalyzed Gulf and Turkish investments, with immediate effects including a 25% strengthening of the Syrian pound against the U.S. dollar.

Gulf States’ Broader Ambitions

Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE envision Syria as a regional economic hub, connecting the Gulf to the Mediterranean through roads, railways, and pipelines, aligning with their Vision 2030 strategies for economic diversification.

Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s $15.5 million payment in April 2025 to clear Syria’s World Bank debt unlocked access to grants and loans, supporting critical infrastructure projects. Qatar’s $29 million monthly commitment to fund civilian salaries, alongside Saudi Arabia’s contributions, stabilizes the economy and enables governance reforms under al-Sharaa’s transitional government.

The UAE’s $800 million deal through DP World to develop the port of Tartus enhances Syria’s role as a maritime trade hub. A proposed Qatar-Turkey gas pipeline through Syria could challenge the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, strengthening Gulf influence while countering Iran’s historical dominance in Syria. By aligning with al-Sharaa’s Sunni-led government, the Gulf states aim to foster regional stability and integration, leveraging Syria’s strategic location.

Turkey’s Railway Ambitions

Turkey is aggressively pursuing railway projects to integrate Syria into the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a U.S.-backed initiative launched at the 2023 G20 Summit to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative. IMEC aims to connect India to Europe via the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and southern European ports, with Syria’s inclusion enhancing its role as a transit hub.

Turkish companies like Yapı Merkezi are poised to build rail infrastructure, leveraging expertise from Turkey’s high-speed rail projects. Turkey’s rival Development Road Project envisions a railway from the Gulf through Iraq and Syria to Europe, but Ankara also seeks to integrate Syria into IMEC to secure contracts and influence. The $7 billion energy deal signed on May 29, 2025, with Qatar and U.S. firms includes rail-linked power plants, signaling Turkey’s intent to connect energy and transport networks. President Erdoğan’s criticism of IMEC for bypassing Turkey underscores Ankara’s push to ensure its inclusion, with Syria’s railways as a critical link to Europe.

Complex Reconstruction Dynamics

Syria’s reconstruction faces significant hurdles, including ongoing violence, ISIS resurgence, and competing regional agendas. Sectarian clashes in Latakia and Hama, including the killing of nearly 900 Alawites in March 2025 and the recent events in the South where Druzes are in the majority, highlight persistent instability.

Turkey’s tensions with the SDF, which control 70% of Syria’s oil and gas, complicate energy and rail projects. Regional rivalries among Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Turkey risk fragmenting reconstruction efforts, as Gulf states’ push for Sunni dominance may clash with Turkey’s trade-driven ambitions. The exclusion of key players like Egypt, which fears losses from the Suez Canal due to IMEC, further undermines regional cooperation. Al-Sharaa’s past al-Qaeda ties and the lack of a unified Syrian government raise concerns about governance and security, potentially deterring Western investment.

Precarious Path Ahead

The lifting of U.S. and EU sanctions has unlocked significant Gulf and Turkish investments, offering Syria a chance to become an economic hub. However, Turkey’s economic fragility, marked by high inflation and a weakened lira, limits its capacity to lead independently. Ongoing violence and ISIS threats demand robust security measures, which al-Sharaa’s government struggles to provide without unified control. The Gulf’s vision of Syria as a trade crossroads is ambitious, but competing agendas and the lack of cohesive governance risk fragmenting efforts. For IMEC and other projects to succeed, regional stability and inclusive governance are essential. Without addressing these challenges, Syria’s reconstruction may remain a battleground for geopolitical rivalries, prolonging instability rather than fostering recovery.