Gaza could be rich. Rich of its offshore gas reserve as the Eastern Mediterranean has emerged as a pivotal region for natural gas discoveries since the late 1990s, with major fields such as Israel’s Leviathan (600 billion cubic meters, bcm), Egypt’s Zohr (850 bcm), and the Gaza Marine field (~28–30 bcm) underscoring the region’s substantial energy potential.
The Gaza Marine field, located approximately 30 km offshore from the Gaza Strip, was discovered in 2000 by British Gas (BG) and the Palestinian Consolidated Contractors Company (CCC). It represents a critical opportunity for the Palestinian Authority to address Gaza’s chronic energy shortages and generate independent revenue, estimated at $4 billion, thereby reducing dependence on foreign aid. However, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly following Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in 2007, has impeded development, with Israel citing security and legal concerns over maritime rights and asserting control over Gaza’s territorial waters.
Geographical Context & Estimated Reserves
The Gaza Marine gas field is situated approximately 30 km offshore from the Gaza Strip in the Eastern Mediterranean, within the maritime boundaries claimed by the Palestinian Authority under the 1993 Oslo Accords. The field comprises two primary structures, Marine 1 and Marine 2, located in shallow waters, rendering extraction technically feasible. It lies within the broader Levant Basin, a hydrocarbon-rich region hosting major fields such as Israel’s Leviathan, Tamar and Egypt’s Zohr, as mentioned above.
The Gaza Marine field’s proximity to Gaza positions it as a potential energy source for the territory, which endures severe power shortages, with only 4–6 hours of daily electricity supply.
The Gaza Marine field holds an estimated 28–30 bcm of natural gas, valued at approximately $4 billion based on global market prices. Although modest compared to Leviathan or Zohr, this reserve could significantly bolster Gaza’s economy by powering its sole power plant and generating revenue for the Palestinian Authority, potentially reducing reliance on foreign aid. The field’s capacity supports domestic consumption and limited exports, but its economic viability hinges on infrastructure development and regional cooperation.
In June 2023, Israel approved the development of the Gaza Marine field, with Egypt’s state-owned Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company (EGAS) tasked with leading extraction efforts in collaboration with the Palestinian Authority. This decision followed years of stalled negotiations and was viewed as a step toward delivering economic benefits to Palestinians, though Israel stipulated that Hamas must not benefit financially.
As of August 2025, active exploration or production has yet to commence due to the ongoing conflict in Gaza, which disrupts infrastructure planning and deters investment. Egypt’s mediation role reflects its interest in fostering regional energy stability, but domestic opposition in Egypt to cooperation with Israel amid the Gaza conflict complicates progress.
Economic Potential of the Gaza Marine Gas Field
The Gaza Marine gas field, with an estimated 28–30 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas, holds substantial economic potential for the Palestinian Authority, valued at approximately $4 billion based on current global gas prices.
This revenue could finance critical infrastructure, such as upgrading Gaza’s power plant, which currently operates at 20% capacity, and support public services, reducing the Palestinian Authority’s dependence on foreign aid, which accounts for 30% of its budget. Gas exports to neighboring countries, such as Jordan or Egypt, could further enhance economic returns, creating employment opportunities and fostering energy independence for Gaza, where 80% of residents rely on humanitarian assistance.
The development of the Gaza Marine field faces significant economic and logistical obstacles. The high capital costs for offshore drilling platforms, subsea pipelines, and processing facilities, estimated at $1–2 billion, pose a substantial barrier, particularly given the field’s modest size compared to regional counterparts. The absence of existing infrastructure in Gaza necessitates reliance on Egyptian or Israeli facilities, increasing costs and complexity. Investor reluctance persists due to the high-risk environment, with 70% of energy projects in conflict zones globally experiencing delays or cancellations.
Additionally, revenue-sharing disputes between the Palestinian Authority and potential partners, compounded by Israel’s condition that Hamas not benefit, complicate financial planning.
Regional Comparisons
Compared to Israel’s Leviathan field, which generates $10 billion annually in export revenue, or Egypt’s Zohr field, which meets 40% of Egypt’s gas demand, the Gaza Marine field’s output is smaller but locally transformative. Israel’s success in developing Leviathan highlights the advantages of stable governance and international partnerships, which Gaza currently lacks.
Egypt’s Zohr field, despite its scale, faces production declines, prompting Egypt to import 130 bcm of Israeli gas through 2040, underscoring regional interdependence. The Gaza Marine field’s development could integrate into this network by leveraging Egypt’s underutilized processing capacity, but it requires overcoming economic and logistical constraints unique to Gaza’s context.
Geopolitical Dynamics & Key Stakeholders
The Palestinian Authority asserts jurisdiction over Gaza’s territorial waters under the 1993 Oslo Accords, which grant it limited control over maritime resources up to 20 nautical miles offshore. The Gaza Marine gas field represents a vital opportunity for the Palestinian Authority to achieve economic independence, potentially generating revenue to fund governance and public services in the West Bank and Gaza. However, it’s influence is constrained by its lack of control over Gaza since Hamas’s takeover in 2007, which has shifted de facto authority to Hamas. The Palestinian Authority’s negotiations with Israel and Egypt for the field’s development are complicated by its limited political leverage and reliance on international mediators, such as the United States and Qatar, to broker agreements. It’s primary objective is to ensure that gas revenues flow to its coffers, bolstering its legitimacy as the representative of Palestinian interests.
As the governing authority in Gaza since 2007, Hamas seeks a share of the Gaza Marine field’s revenues to sustain its administration and social programs, which serve 2 million residents facing severe economic hardship. Hamas’s involvement poses a significant challenge, as Israel has conditioned the field’s development on excluding Hamas from financial benefits, citing concerns over potential funding for militant activities. Hamas’s exclusion from formal negotiations, combined with its control over Gaza’s territory, creates a deadlock, as the group could disrupt development efforts through political or military means.
Public sentiment expressed on Social Media platforms reflects frustration among some Palestinian supporters who view Hamas’s exclusion as an attempt to undermine Gaza’s autonomy.
Therefore, Israel plays a pivotal role as the de facto controller of Gaza’s maritime access and airspace, exercising significant influence over the Gaza Marine field’s development. Its approval in June 2023 for Egypt’s EGAS to lead extraction efforts signals a willingness to support Palestinian economic development under strict conditions, primarily to prevent Hamas from benefiting. Israel’s own gas fields, such as Leviathan and Tamar, have established it as a regional energy exporter, with a $35 billion deal signed in August 2025 to supply Egypt with 130 bcm of gas through 2040. This economic leverage strengthens Israel’s role in regional energy markets, but its control over Gaza’s waters fuels accusations of obstructing Palestinian resource rights, though evidence suggests that security concerns, rather than resource appropriation, drive its policies.
In this story, Egypt serves as a mediator in the Gaza Marine field’s development, leveraging its position in the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) to facilitate cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Its state-owned EGAS was tasked in 2023 with leading extraction efforts, reflecting Egypt’s interest in integrating the field into regional energy networks. However, Egypt’s $35 billion gas import deal with Israel has sparked domestic criticism, particularly amid public outrage over the Gaza conflict and Egypt’s management of the Rafah crossing.
Egypt’s mediation is driven by its need to address declining domestic gas production, which has decreased by 20% since 2019, necessitating reliance on Israeli imports to meet 30% of its energy demand. Balancing domestic political pressures with regional energy objectives remains a challenge for Egypt.
The East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), comprising Israel, Egypt, the PA, Jordan, Cyprus, Greece, and Italy, promotes regional energy cooperation and could facilitate the Gaza Marine field’s integration into export markets. The United States has played a role in brokering maritime agreements, such as the 2022 Israel-Lebanon deal, which resolved disputes over the Karish field and could serve as a model for Gaza. Neutral mediators like Qatar and Norway have supported PA-Israel negotiations, offering technical and financial expertise to advance gas projects in conflict zones.
These actors aim to stabilize the region by fostering economic interdependence, but their influence is limited by ongoing violence and political fragmentation.
Geopolitical Tensions
The Gaza Marine field is entangled in broader Eastern Mediterranean disputes over maritime boundaries, exacerbated by the lack of clear delineation under international law. Israel’s non-signatory status to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) complicates Palestinian claims to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ), as Israel asserts security-based control over Gaza’s waters.
Overlapping claims with Lebanon and Cyprus further heighten tensions, as evidenced by the 2022 Israel-Lebanon maritime agreement, which required U.S. mediation to resolve. The ongoing Gaza conflict, intensified since October 2023, disrupts development prospects, with 80% of Gaza’s infrastructure damaged, deterring investment.
Public sentiment in Egypt highlight anger reflects frustration over Israel’s actions in Gaza and Egypt’s energy deals, with protests demanding closure of the Rafah crossing. These tensions underscore the challenge of advancing the Gaza Marine field’s development amid competing national interests and regional instability.
Public sentiment suggests that indicates that some believe Israel’s ongoing conflict with Gaza is partly motivated by a desire to control the Gaza Marine gas field, estimated at 28–30 billion cubic meters (bcm) and valued at approximately $4 billion. Proponents argue that Israel’s control over Gaza’s maritime access, coupled with its historical objections to the field’s development, suggests a strategic intent to limit Palestinian economic gains.
The Gaza Marine field, located 30–36 km offshore, can be seen as having a “strategic value” due to its shallow depth (610 meters) and potential to yield significant revenue for Gaza’s economy. Critics point to Israel’s naval blockade, intensified since Hamas’s 2007 takeover, as evidence of efforts to prevent Palestinian access to offshore resources. Additionally, some sources speculate that Israel’s actions aim to secure Gaza’s gas to bolster its regional energy dominance, particularly given the field’s proximity to Israel’s larger Leviathan field (600 bcm).
Tel Aviv can be seen as being greedy especially since its motivations are questioned, as its own gas fields, such as Leviathan and Tamar, provide reserves approximately 20 times the size of Gaza Marine, undermining the argument that these smaller fields are critical to it’s energy security.
Israel’s conditions for development, particularly ensuring that Hamas does not benefit, has put a spoke in the wheels of economic development. Israel has to show more resolve to mitigate disputes and can build on its precedent of cooperation, as demonstrated in the 2022 Israel-Lebanon maritime agreement, which resolved disputes over the Karish field, which sets a precedent for cooperation rather than brute occupation to foster collaborative solutions.
Furthermore, legal analyses suggests that Israel lacks formal grounds to claim the Gaza Marine gas field; its leverage stems from maritime control under the Oslo Accords’ security provisions which provides it security oversight.
Egypt’s Complicity
Egypt’s role in the Gaza Marine field’s development and its energy cooperation with Israel have led to accusations of complicity in sidelining Palestinian interests. Egypt’s $35 billion deal in August 2025 to import 130 bcm of gas from Israel’s Leviathan field through 2040 has drawn criticism, particularly amid public anger in Egypt over the Gaza conflict and the humanitarian crisis at the Rafah crossing.
Egyptians have protested against this deal, arguing that it deepens Egypt’s energy dependence on Israel while Gaza’s resources remain untapped. Critics also point to Egypt’s mediation role, with EGAS holding a 45% stake in Gaza Marine, as potentially prioritizing Egyptian economic interests over Palestinian sovereignty. Some sources suggest that Egypt’s involvement in the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) and its alignment with Israel on gas exports to Europe could marginalize the PA’s control over its resources.
It can be counter argued that Egypt’s actions are primarily driven by energy security needs rather than complicity in undermining Palestinian interests. Domestic gas production in Egypt has declined by 20% since 2019, necessitating imports to meet 30% of its energy demand. The Leviathan deal addresses this shortfall, ensuring stability for Egypt’s 105 million citizens, who face frequent power shortages. Egypt’s mediation in the Gaza Marine field’s development, including EGAS’s leadership, aims to unlock economic benefits for the PA, with revenues estimated at $700–800 million annually for Palestinian use.
Egypt’s role in the EMGF facilitates regional cooperation, including its stated plans to process Gaza Marine’s gas at Egypt’s Idku and Damietta facilities for export, which could integrate Palestinian gas into global markets. The 2023 agreement ensures that 55% of the project’s stakes are held by Palestinian entities (Palestine Investment Fund and Consolidated Contractors Company), countering claims of marginalization.
While public protests in Egypt do reflect domestic frustration, but critics argue that they do not negate Egypt’s diplomatic efforts to support Palestinian economic development.
Are these accusations of Egypt’s complicity an oversimplification of its complex role as a mediator and energy-dependent state? Egypt’s gas import deal with Israel can be seen as is a pragmatic response to meet its domestic energy shortages; it need not be viewed as a deliberate alignment against Palestinian interests. Its mediation in the Gaza Marine field’s development, with EGAS’s 45% stake, is structured to benefit the PA through revenue-sharing and energy supply, as evidenced by plans to pipe gas to Gaza’s power plant.
While public sentiment in Egypt perceives views cooperation with Israel as complicity amid Gaza’s humanitarian crisis, this perspective overlooks Egypt’s broader diplomatic efforts, including its role in Gaza reconstruction since 2021. The EMGF framework supports equitable resource development, and Egypt’s involvement ensures Palestinian access to processing infrastructure, which Gaza lacks.
However, Egypt must navigate domestic political pressures, as protests highlight tensions over its ties with Israel, particularly regarding Rafah.
Technical & Infrastructure Considerations
The development of the Gaza Marine gas field, located 30–36 km offshore from the Gaza Strip in shallow waters, requires significant technical expertise and infrastructure investment. The field, comprising Marine 1 and Marine 2, necessitates offshore drilling platforms capable of operating in the Eastern Mediterranean’s complex carbonate reservoirs.
Drilling operations require semi-submersible rigs or jack-up rigs, with estimated costs for exploration and appraisal wells ranging from $100–150 million per well, based on regional benchmarks. Extraction will involve subsea production systems, including wellheads and flowlines, to transport gas to processing facilities. Egypt’s state-owned EGAS, tasked with leading development since Israel’s approval in June 2023, brings expertise from its Zohr field operations, which employ similar subsea technologies.
Collaboration with international oil companies, such as Chevron (active in Israel’s Leviathan field), could provide technical support, but Gaza’s lack of local expertise and regulatory framework necessitates reliance on external partners. The absence of active exploration as of August 2025, due to ongoing conflict, delays the deployment of these technologies, with initial feasibility studies still pending.
Further, Moreover, transporting Gaza Marine’s gas requires a robust pipeline network, as Gaza lacks onshore processing facilities. The proposed plan involves a 36-km subsea pipeline from the Gaza Marine field to Egypt’s Idku or Damietta liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants, which have a combined capacity of 12.2 million tonnes per annum but are currently underutilized at 60% capacity.
This pipeline would connect to existing regional infrastructure, such as the Arish-Ashkelon pipeline, which transports Israeli gas to Egypt, offering a cost-effective route estimated at $500–700 million to construct. Alternatively, a shorter pipeline to Gaza’s shore for local power generation is feasible but requires upgrading the Gaza Power Plant, which operates at 20% capacity due to fuel shortages.
Conflict-related disruptions, including damage to 80% of Gaza’s infrastructure since October 2023, pose significant risks to pipeline construction, with delays potentially extending timelines by 2–3 years. Egypt’s experience in managing cross-border pipelines, such as the East Mediterranean Gas (EMG) pipeline, positions it to oversee this infrastructure, but coordination with Israel and the PA is critical to align technical and security requirements.
Economic Impact
The development of the Gaza Marine field must balance environmental sustainability with economic benefits. Offshore gas extraction poses risks of methane leaks and marine ecosystem disruption, particularly in the Levant Basin’s biodiverse waters, which host critical habitats for species such as loggerhead turtles.
Adopting best practices, such as low-emission drilling technologies used in Israel’s Leviathan field, could mitigate these impacts, but Gaza’s lack of environmental regulations complicates enforcement. Economically, the field could transform Gaza’s energy landscape by supplying its power plant, reducing reliance on imported electricity (currently 70% from Israel) and alleviating chronic outages affecting 1.9 million residents.
Job creation is another benefit, with offshore gas projects typically generating 500–1,000 direct jobs during construction and 200–300 permanent jobs for operations, based on regional examples like Egypt’s Zohr field. Local training programs, potentially supported by EMGF initiatives, could build capacity among Gaza’s 45% unemployed workforce, fostering long-term economic resilience.
However, environmental costs and economic benefits depend on stable governance and conflict resolution, as ongoing violence deters investment and increases project risks.
Security Risks & Challenges
The ongoing conflict in Gaza poses a significant security risk to the development of the Gaza Marine gas field. The conflict has led to the destruction of 80% of Gaza’s infrastructure, including critical energy facilities, severely disrupting the feasibility of offshore exploration and pipeline construction.
Offshore drilling platforms and subsea infrastructure are vulnerable to military escalation, with past incidents of rocket fire and naval skirmishes in the Eastern Mediterranean increasing operational risks. Case in point, For example, regional energy projects, such as Lebanon’s Qana field, have faced delays due to similar security concerns, with 70% of offshore projects in conflict zones globally experiencing disruptions.
These risks deter international oil companies, as evidenced by Chevron’s cautious approach to expanding operations in contested waters. The lack of a stable ceasefire, coupled with the presence of non-state actors like Hamas, which controls Gaza’s governance, heightens the threat of sabotage or attacks on infrastructure, potentially delaying the Gaza Marine field’s development by 3–5 years.Legal and Sovereignty Issues
The Gaza Marine field’s development is complicated by unresolved legal and sovereignty disputes over Gaza’s maritime boundaries. The 1993 Oslo Accords grant the Palestinian Authority limited control over territorial waters up to 20 nautical miles, but Israel’s non-signatory status to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) undermines the PA’s claim to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extending 200 nautical miles.
This legal ambiguity creates uncertainty over resource ownership, as Israel maintains security-based control over Gaza’s maritime access, limiting the PA’s ability to negotiate contracts independently.
Similar disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean, such as those between Cyprus and Turkey, have delayed gas projects by years, requiring international arbitration. The PA’s lack of recognized statehood further weakens its legal standing in international forums, complicating efforts to secure development rights.
Without a clear maritime agreement, potentially mediated by the United States or the United Nations, the Gaza Marine project faces prolonged legal challenges, deterring investors wary of jurisdictional risks.
Political Instability & Economic Viability
Political fragmentation between the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza creates a significant barrier to the Gaza Marine field’s development. The PA’s limited authority over Gaza since Hamas’s 2007 takeover hinders unified decision-making, as Hamas demands a share of gas revenues to sustain its administration, a condition Israel rejects due to security concerns.
This internal Palestinian divide complicates negotiations with Egypt’s EGAS and international partners, as conflicting interests undermine project coordination. Regional political tensions, including Egypt’s domestic unrest over its $35 billion gas import deal with Israel, further destabilize the project’s political environment, with protests reflecting public discontent over perceived alignment with Israel.
The absence of a stable governance framework in Gaza, where 45% unemployment and ongoing violence exacerbate social unrest, risks derailing development efforts, as seen in similar politically volatile regions like Libya, where gas projects have stalled for over a decade.
The Gaza Marine field’s modest size (28–30 bcm) raises concerns about its economic viability, given the high capital costs of offshore development. Initial investment for drilling, pipelines, and processing facilities is estimated at $1–2 billion, a significant burden for a conflict-affected region with limited financial resources. Compared to Israel’s Leviathan field, which required $6 billion but benefits from larger reserves and stable governance, the Gaza Marine field’s smaller scale offers a lower return on investment, potentially discouraging private-sector involvement.
The reliance on Egyptian infrastructure, such as the Idku LNG plant, reduces costs but introduces revenue-sharing complexities, with Egypt holding a 45% stake in the project.
Additionally, global gas market volatility, with prices fluctuating between $2–$5 per million British thermal units in 2024, adds financial uncertainty, as the Gaza Marine field’s profitability depends on sustained high prices.
Without international funding, such as World Bank grants or Gulf investment, the project risks remaining economically unfeasible, particularly given Gaza’s lack of creditworthiness and investor confidence.
Future Outlook
Every venture has risks attached, not capitalizing on available resources may not be the smartest way forward. After all despite inherent risks, the Gaza Marine gas field could become a transformative asset for the Palestinian Authority within 3–5 years, provided significant progress is made in resolving legal and security challenges.
International recognition of Palestinian maritime rights, potentially through arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or mediation by neutral parties like Norway or Qatar, could clarify Gaza’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), enabling the PA to assert control over the field’s 28–30 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas. Egypt’s EGAS, with its 45% stake, could lead development, leveraging its expertise from the Zohr field to deploy drilling rigs and construct a 36-km subsea pipeline to Egypt’s Idku LNG plant by 2028.
This would enable gas production to commence, supplying Gaza’s power plant and generating $700–800 million annually in revenue for the Palestinian Authority, reducing its reliance on foreign aid by 20–30%.
International funding from the World Bank or Gulf states, such as Qatar’s $500 million energy investment in Lebanon’s Qana field, could cover the estimated $1–2 billion development costs. Regional cooperation through the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) could integrate the Gaza Marine field’s output into export markets, enhancing economic stability and fostering trust among Israel, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority.
When there is a will there is a way: With sustained commitment, a ceasefire and political reconciliation between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas could lead to a scenario which create conditions to ensure security for investors and infrastructure development, fostering a mutually beneficial outcome for all stakeholders a win-win scenario for all concerned.
